Gefur AGS út pólitískt litaðar efnahagsspár?

þessi  skýrsla Center for policy economic and recearch fjallar um efnahagsspár AGS í Argentínu og Venezuela.

The International Monetary Fund’s projections for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in Argentina since 1999, and in Venezuela since 2003, contain a pattern of large errors that raises serious questions about the objectivity of these estimates. In Argentina, the IMF overestimated GDP growth for 2000, 2001, and 2002 by 2.3, 8.1, and 13.5 percentage points respectively. (See Table 1.) These were projections published in the IMF's September World Economic Outlook (WEO) of each preceding year; other IMF projections for Argentina during this period were also off target, in the same direction.

Er stofnun eins og AGS pólitískt hlutdræg þegar kemur að mati á efnahagshorfum?

Það hafði góð áhrif á efnahag Argentínu að losa sig við AGS

Þessi skýrsla fjallar um efnahagsþróunn í Argentínu síðan 2001 þegar að ríkisjóður Argentínu komst í greiðsluþrot. Í inngangi segir;

Argentina’s current economic expansion is now more than five and a half years old, and has far exceeded the expectations of most econom...ists and the business media. Despite a record sovereign debt default of $100 billion in December 2001 and a financial collapse, the economy began growing just three months after the default and has enjoyed uninterrupted growth since then. The country's GDP during this period has grown by more than 50 percent, making Argentina the fastest growing economy in the western hemisphere during this time. In the process, more than 11 million people, in a country of 39 million, have been pulled back onto the positive side of the poverty line. Furthermore, this recovery was accomplished without any help from the international financial institutions (IFIs) that had (led by the International Monetary Fund) – provided tens of billions of dollars in loans prior to the collapse; and with the use of unorthodox

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